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‘PEOPLE ARE WILLING TO FIGHT TO THE END’. ROMANTICISING THE 
‘MORAL’ IN MORAL ECONOMIES OF IRRIGATION 
 
Abstract 
This article is about the continued salience of a particular understanding of moral economy in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the fact that a significant body of anthropological theory argues 
against simplified binaries of market and moral economies, such binaries persist. These either 
romanticise or vilify moral economies and exist in both policy and academic contexts. Thus, 
moral economies are said to drive corruption or shape anti-market cultural stances. 
Meanwhile, a romantic fantasy of a non-capitalist rural economy oriented by morality rather 
than economic rationality continues to animate areas of development policy and to direct 
funding. My argument is not with the concept of moral economy itself, but with how it is 
marshalled in support of both romantic and sometimes negatively essentialised conceptions 
of people and places. The article sets out the case for the persistence of these ideas, focusing 
on the their application to irrigation development and the problems with this. I then use an 
example from southern Malawi to illustrate how moral ideas of fairness and reciprocity 
interplay with processes of differentiation in access to (and exclusion from) land and labour 
and influence how people manage scarce resources.  Whilst there are moral discourses and a 
mutual embeddness of the moral and economic, these reflect a range of ethically-informed 
positions which are influenced by social position and power. However, this emic perspective 
is largely absent from the more romanticised models. I conclude by reflecting on the politics 
of their persistence. 
 
Moral economy, irrigation, Malawi, Africa 
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Introduction 
How do ‘moral economies’ play a role in the collective management of natural resources? 
Are there specifically ‘African’ moralities that enable or constrain this? Despite a wealth of 
anthropological argument against reification and dichomotising in the treatment of the 
relationship between economy and morality (Alexander et al 2019, De Neve et  al. 2008, Mc 
Namara 2019, Olivier de Sardan 2013, Palomera and Vetta 2016, Siméant 2015) these 
questions are still posed by those who seek to make sense of ‘the social’ and ‘culture’ as 
barriers to (or facilitators of) the success of development interventions. This is sometimes 
manifested as a romantic fantasy of a non-capitalist rural economy oriented by morality 
rather than economic rationality. The possible benefits of the generalised reciprocity and 
mutual obligation implied by notions such as moral economy are may be viewed positively, 
especially when seen as an element of the ‘social capital’ that is of interest to some 
development donors (Fine 2008,  Levien 2015), and as key to the successful functioning of a 
‘New Green Revolution’ (Kimambo et al. 2008) or underpinning reciprocity and sharing 
(Brewis et al 2019, Wutich et al 2018).  Alternatively, moral economy is a barrier, seen in 
arguments that suggest that a particular ‘African moral economy’ has hampered the success 
of interventions such as the Green Revolution (e.g. Sugimura 2008), or underpins problems 
of African corruption (Olivier de Sardan 19991; Whyte and Wietgratz 2016, Wiegratz 2016).  
 
This paper interrogates these uses of moral economy, particularly as they have been 
discussed in relation to agriculture and to the specific case of irrigation management.  The 
management of small-scale irrigation has been a preoccupation for policy makers in recent 
years, partly because sub-Saharan Africa is repeatedly presented as not living up to its 
                                               
1 Olivier de Sardan argues against a monolithic or deterministic theory of culture, but his 
argument concerning the ‘logics’ of corruption still lends itself to this interpretation, revealed 
in more simplistic accounts of ‘African corruption’ (Harrison 2004). 
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irrigation potential. Problems and possibilities in irrigation development have also been 
conceptualised partly in terms of the culturally embedded characteristics of communities, 
while solutions to these problems have incorporated institutional intervention in such 
characteristics; processes of formalisation that render them both legible and controllable 
(Oates et al. 2015; Ostrom 2010;  Suhardiman et al 2014, Venot 2014). Recently, donors such 
as the World Bank have reiterated the potential significance of ‘farmer-led irrigation’ based 
on narratives of modernity in which the ‘entrepreneurial’ and productive farmer, assisted by 
market-oriented irrigation, is contrasted to his or her fellows who are still locked in a pre-
capitalist ethics of subsistence (Harrison and Mdee 2018) As De Bont et al (2019: 107) put it, 
thus ‘reducing them discursively to backward peasants incapable of innovation without the 
external intervention and administration of the government’.  
 
In the following sections, I revisit the intellectual background to accounts of moral economy 
and their application to irrigation development, identifying how such ideas have specific 
political orientations. Palomera and Vetta have recently (2016) suggested that the radical 
foundations of the term moral economy need to be reclaimed, avoiding the binary thinking 
that has characterized several contemporary articulations of the approach. I agree with this 
and argue that this requires an unpacking of the assumptions on which they rest, including in 
the context of irrigation development. This may in turn help to explain their continuing 
attractiveness, which has much to do with the political (or sometimes apparently apolitical) 
flavour of the more romantic articulations.   
 
Turning to an ethnographic example of irrigation management in Southern Malawi, I explore 
two key themes that have been significant when it comes to the deployment of ideas of moral 
economy in analyses of irrigation: first, how principles such as fairness and reciprocity 
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intersect with access to and control over land and labour, so as to influence how people 
manage scarce resources; and second, the issue of how autonomy and the nature of 
‘community’ apparently shape institutional and bureaucratic legitimacy. This shows how 
diverse moral discourses do not constitute a ‘moral economy’ as commonly described, so 
much as a range of ethically-informed positions which are influenced in dynamic ways by 
economics, history and social position. Among these, gender is an important, but not the 
only, marker of differentiation. In the concluding discussion, I reflect on the reasons for the 
continuing attractiveness of the more romantic views of moral economy, particularly as they 
are applied to irrigation development. 
 
The contested politics of moral economies  
Moral economy is a ‘polysemic category’ (Edelman 2012: 59), having a complex genealogy, 
multiple interpretations and a ‘rather promiscuous deployment’ (Alexander et al 2019: 124). 
Most authors point to the significance of the work of EP Thompson (1971, 1991) and James 
Scott (1976) in shaping its use, though Thompson himself emphasised the much earlier 
origins of the term2. However, there is considerable diversity in the political orientation of 
those who seek to identify and understand moral economies. Thompson’s original usage had 
its roots in class analysis and an emphasis on historical specificity. Indeed, he demonstrates 
considerable frustration with those who sought to extend its application, writing in 1991 that: 
‘It was not about all kinds of crowd, and a reader would have to be unusually thick-headed 
who supposed so. It was about the crowd’s ‘moral economy’ in a context which the article 
defines’ (Thompson 1991: 260). His concern was with social conflict, in which he clearly 
                                               
2 In the 1991 essay ‘Moral Economy Reviewed’, Thompson suggests that the term probably 
originated in the late 18th Century and cites an 1837 sources of an example. In his (2015) 
critique of Thompson, Götz identifies a wide range of even earlier uses. 
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distinguished himself from the work of structural functionalist anthropologists who draw on 
the work of Durkheim and are more likely to emphasise harmony and consensus. Thompson 
also robustly differentiated himself from the laissez-faire implications of Adam Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations. For Thompson, the focus of enquiry is not a ‘community’, understood as 
people in a place, but a specific group of people, identified as ‘the poor’, and particularly 
those who experience a dearth of food and respond to it through protest. They are part of an 
economy and they have moral sentiments about what it right and wrong, which is partly what 
stimulates their action. But for Thompson, moral economy does not simply revolve around 
norms that do not change. As I will discuss, one of the problems with some of the recent 
romantic interpretations of moral economy is precisely that it is taken to refer to people in a 
place, elided with ‘community’, without questioning the boundary-making and differentiation 
that are inevitably part of this. 
Scott was also concerned with class conflict. For him, a moral economy is a social order 
based on principles of reciprocity and responsibility that include the right of everyone to have 
access to the means of subsistence and survival along with obligations to give and receive. 
This includes notions of economic justice and exploitation among peasants which, he 
suggests, is ‘representative of peasants everywhere’ (Scott 1976: 3). Scott argued that moral 
economies are threatened by the introduction of capitalism which is not subject to the same 
values.  Like Thompson, his empirical focus was protest, though in the colonised and recently 
decolonised nations of Southeast Asia, primarily Burma and Vietnam. Scott also urged 
against romanticising moral economies, though his work has lent itself to such 
interpretations, as I discuss below. 
Some of the more influential accounts of moral economy were thus strongly influenced by 
Marxism. The concept has, however, also been used by authors who have emphasised the 
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more harmonious elements of moral economy but without a corresponding analysis of class, 
power or politics.  For example, Booth (1984) equates ‘moral economists’ with functionalist 
anthropologists such as Evans Pritchard and draws on Polanyi’s (1954) notion of the Great 
Transformation in support of this. For Booth, the idea of the ‘embedded’ moral economy is 
deployed in explaining the transition from ‘traditional societies to the present epoch’ (1984: 
653). More recently, Bryceson (2010) has discussed the moral economies of ‘African 
societies’ in similar terms: she emphasises a ‘subsistence ethic of social responsibility’ (2010: 
3), which is both coherent and based on shared social identity.  African moral economy 
constructs in this account include the linking of production for wealth and social distribution; 
the creation of wealth to build relational ties and the significance of distributive 
responsibilities. Bryceson suggests that ‘Any small-scale rural community where everyone 
knows each other and follows roughly the same agrarian way of life can cohere as a moral 
economy’ (2010: 4).  
In Bryceson and Booth’s analyses, moral economies exist outside of, and precede the 
development of capitalism. They are also reified, tending to be based on generalisations 
rather than empirical or historical specificities. This is also the case in certain other 
reinterpretations of moral economy, among which the work of Goran Hyden is particularly 
influential. For example, in a volume on ‘Contemporary perspectives on African Moral 
Economy’ (Kimambo et al. 2008), Sugimura (2008) argues that a revitalised understanding of 
African moral economies can be important in aspirations towards sustainable development.  
This is because the ‘disastrous stagnation of rural Africa must be related to some unique 
mechanism that underlies peasant economies in Africa’ (2008:3), but there is nevertheless 
hope, in that ‘Formerly the moral economy of African peasants was seen as the main 
‘problem’ or ‘difficulty’ for Africa’s development because of its incompatibility with the 
‘Green Revolution’, but recently it has begun to be considered as the key to ‘another Green 
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Revolution’ that would bring about a symbiotic relationship between nature and human 
beings’ (Sugimura 2008: 4).  
This 2008 volume explicitly builds on Hyden’s work on the ‘economy of affection’ (1980, 
1983) and includes a chapter by Hyden himself.  For Hyden, the ‘economy of affection’ was 
(and is) a type of moral economy which is at the root of both clientelism and various forms of 
reciprocity. It forms a network of support among groups connected by a variety of 
characteristics, including kinship and community3. In this analysis the ‘African peasantry’ is 
‘uncaptured’; smallholder farmers are outside of the ‘formal economy’ and rely strongly on 
custom, unwritten codes and interpersonal relations4. Being ‘uncaptured’ includes both 
autonomy and the ability to do things on one’s own, thus denying others their influence. He 
suggests that informal institutions combine clientelism, pooling, charisma and self defense in 
order to undermine the work of formal institutions. Hyden argues that: ‘The modern market 
economy is a culturally foreign institution that 'people in these countries approach with 
caution and when doing so with little understanding of how to use it for ends other than very 
short term personal ones’ (2008: 30).  
During the 1980s, Hyden’s arguments were the subject of robust criticism.  As Kasfir (1986: 
339) put it: ‘I think Hyden’s argument is thoroughly misconceived. It overstates peasant self-
sufficiency to the point where it blocks understanding of the complex relations, partly 
dependent and partly self-sufficient, that connect peasants to the larger political economy’. 
Kasfir, and subsequently Willliams (1987) point to the significance of agricultural wage 
                                               
3 Hyden refers to Scott’s work in No Shortcuts to Progress (Hyden 1983), but only in 
passing. It is not necessarily the case that Scott would agree with the equation of ‘economy of 
affection’ with ‘moral economy’. 
4 Waters (2007) has argued for the persistence of the ‘economy of affection’, drawing on 
Hyden to argue that ‘peasants’, including in contemporary Tanzania, live ‘beneath’ the 
marketplace and remain uncaptured.	
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labour in contributing to differentiation. Cliffe (1987: 626) noted that Kasfir’s critique was so 
devasating as to ‘make one wonder why this line of argument was ever taken seriously’, and 
concluded that empirical analysis should substitute for a search for ‘general laws of motion’ 
of African peasants.  
 
The important insight from these critics of Hyden and of others who focus on moral 
economies as separate and non-relational, is that it is important to understand the nature of 
the relationships that contribute to differentiation. As Olivier de Sardan (2013) argues, many 
moral economy approaches have tended to over-emphasise the ‘great divide’ (Latour 1993) 
between capitalist and pre-capitalist societies or ‘moral economies’, resulting in a ‘central 
opposition’ (Olivier de Sardan 2013: 285) between the formal and the informal and, by 
extension, between market-based and ‘traditional’ social arrangements. Olivier de Sardan 
suggests that, even with Scott and Thompson, there is a strong association between ‘pre-
market’ and traditional and the idea of the moral economy and that the more informal 
institutions that constitute the moral economy are undermined by, yet resist, capitalism. 
While the evidence that Scott and Thompson had such a dichotomous and evolutionist 
perspective on the relation between capitalism and moral economy is limited, the fact that 
they themselves spoke in limited terms of the ‘moral economy of the peasant’, and the ‘moral 
economy of the crowd’ contributes to a subsequent tendency to limit the notion of moral 
economy to particular groups, somehow situated outside of both state and market (Palomera 
and Vetta 2016) as if this were possible in the nineteenth, let alone the twenty-first, centuries. 
As Siméant (2015: 170) notes, the theoretical problem is one of romanticizing societies 
‘outside of the market’ and reinforcing binaries between ‘early’ and ‘modern’ societies. 
However, in case of irrigation, such binaries continue to be reinforced and are given new 
salience in the context of the ‘new Green Revolution’ which emphasises the market in 
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contradistinction to the less modern and subsistence-oriented farming of much of sub-
Saharan Africa. It is to these that I now turn.  
 
Moral economies of irrigation 
Discussions of moral economies of irrigation have tended to reinforce, rather than contest, 
less differentiated approaches. For example, the anthropologist Paul Trawick (2001, 2003) 
draws on Scott and Thompson to describe a ‘moral economy of irrigation’ in the Peruvian 
Andes, based on principles of proportionality, contiguity, autonomy, uniformity, transparency 
and regularity. He suggests that the rules constitute a system that enables farmers to work 
together to share water resources in an equitable and fair way that is also effective and 
sustainable and that such principles occur more widely in both the Andes and beyond.  
Understanding these, he argues, can enable policy recommendations ‘for resolving situations 
of tragedy’ (Trawick 2001: 3). For Trawick, where such systems have ‘broken down’, it is 
precisely because of the stratifying effects caused by their interaction with capitalism. More 
recently, Trawick et al. (2014) have pursued this argument with comparative research in 
Spain, arguing that a similar moral economy, also based on principles of equity, transparency 
and fairness, and rooted in ‘moral principles dating back to Islamic times’, (2014: 94) has 
independently evolved and that ‘its adaptive dynamics are shown to be of great relevance to 
small farmers today as they face the growing scarcity of water being induced by population 
growth and by climate change’ (2014: 87). Trawick et al. (2014) argue in favour of seeking 
out such moral economies of water use in other contexts.  
 
The interpretation of moral economy provided by Trawick et al. relies on a principle of the 
autonomy of both ‘irrigation systems’ and ‘communities’. In contrast, Garrido (2014) 
examines 19th Century accounts of the same irrigation systems, questioning whether they 
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were run by irrigators along democratic lines and based on ‘principles established by the 
Moors’. These are myths, he argues, but have nonetheless been influential in subsequent 
suggestions that water users’ associations (WUAs) should be supported in irrigation 
development in other contexts. As Venot (2014) argues, there have been problems with such 
institutional approaches in which WUAs have been treated as panaceas, including those that 
build on the work of Ostrom (1990, 2010). Ostrom, focusing specifically on common 
property resource management, stressed the significance of crafting institutions for 
sustainable management, based on rules, or ‘design principles’. This work has been important 
in refuting ‘tragedy of the commons’ arguments (Hardin 1968) that emphasise management 
failures in the absence of the state or clear private property relations.  However, it has also 
been adopted and simplified by the ‘social engineering’ approaches that have characterised 
much development intervention and thinking (Merrey and Cook 2012). This is despite the 
fact that Ostrom herself warned against such simplified usage (Venot 2014). According to 
Venot, these approaches to WUAs ‘convey an over-formalized approach to water resources 
governance that overlooks the pluralist nature of common property resources management 
and the multiple arenas in which participation, authority, legitimacy and accountability are 
continuously negotiated among multiple actors’ (2014: 544-5). Such formalization is also 
part and parcel of the narratives of irrigation management that characterize much 
contemporary policy discourse (de Bont et al 2019, Veldwisch et al 2019). 
 
A range of scholars has also sought to identify specifically ‘African’ moral economies for the 
management of irrigation. Some approach the issue of moral economies for irrigation from 
the perspective of collective action theory (Muchara et al. 2014), asking what determines 
whether and how farmers participate in collective action when irrigation schemes are handed 
over to them. There has also been extensive debate concerning ‘solidarity networks’ in 
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constraining and facilitating local level organisations (Bernard et al 2010).  Discussing access 
to water in Senegal, Gomez-Temezio (2016: 654) has recently argued that ‘Sons of the soil 
narratives shed light on a specific ‘moral economy’ in which people born on the same soil, 
home, have obligations to each other’. Ethnographers have also undertaken detailed historical 
analysis of specific areas and irrigation systems, particularly those with deep ‘traditional’ or 
indigenous roots, for example around Kilimanjaro in Tanzania (Adams and Anderson 1998, 
Bender 2013, Hillbom 2012, Tagseth 2008). In these cases, moral economy is rooted in the 
long history of irrigation management, but such ideas have more general currency too, 
including where irrigation has been more recently introduced.  
 
For those who seek to support irrigation in sub-Saharan Africa, especially when it is seen to 
have failed to live up to expectations, the ‘cultural’ predispositions of irrigating farmers has 
also been viewed as a problem to be explained in order to make sense of failure, rather than 
an set of dispositions and practices that might generate success. For example, in SSA the 
‘potential’ irrigable land area is much greater than that actually irrigated and irrigation is 
considerably less developed than in Asia (You et al. 2010). There are well-documented 
problems of poor management, in which irrigation schemes have been initiated and then 
collapsed and, although the blame for this has partly been placed with weaknesses in the 
public sector (Oates et al. 2015), it is also supposedly found in the essentialised 
characteristics of (unmodernised) community norms and beliefs. This has sometimes 
involved a tendency to blame ‘corrupt, lazy and undisciplined communities’ or ‘cultures of 
jealousy and witchcraft’ (Van Koppen et al. 2012: 1).  
 
While the characteristics of the communities in which irrigation develops have been 
portrayed negatively, their enlistment in attempts to make irrigation more successful has 
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nonetheless also been critical. An extensive literature thus documents the political, technical 
and institutional challenges of irrigation management and reform (Suhardiman et al. 2014). 
One key element of this has been the widespread policy shift from the 1990s onwards 
towards ‘Participatory Irrigation Management’ (PIM) and ‘Irrigation Management Transfer’ 
(IMT) (Sakaki and Koga 2013, Garces-Restrepo 2007) which nominally hands control of 
formerly government-run schemes over to farmers and their representative organisations, 
often WUAs.  For example, in Mwanga district, Tanzania, there is a long history of irrigation 
practice but, since 2001, government policy has required that this irrigation be managed 
through WUAs (Mvungi 2008). However, farmers resisted the WUA rules: there was 
considerable water theft and bribery, along with a reluctance to accept the legitimacy of the 
formal offices of the WUA. Mvungi argues that this is caused by the logic of the economy of 
affection which rejects imported forms of organisation, and in which the farmers remain 
‘uncaptured’.  
 
As with accounts of moral economy in general, these applications to irrigation development 
are clearly problematic. First, they tend to cast irrigating farmers as a form a community that 
is largely separate and autonomous from the outside - a position that is also conveyed in 
Trawick’s (2001, 2003) account of irrigation communities in the Andes.  The concept of ‘the 
community’ and ‘the irrigation community’ can obscure more than it reveals, overlooking 
differences in interests and assuming boundaries between communities and others that in 
reality may be complex and contested5. The meaning of community for different groups of 
people needs to be examined in context, asking both who is within that community and what 
shapes people’s attachment, belonging and inclination to participate. Such issues become 
                                               
5 The literature that engages with the meaning and nature of community is extensive. Key 
texts include Agrawal and Clark 1999; Amit and Rapport 2002; Lovell 1998. 
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especially significant when considering the roles of both new and old institutions in 
representing their ‘communities’, such as WUAs, including how and under what conditions 
they attain legitimacy in their attempts to represent and manage others. 
 
An irrigation scheme in malawi 
The discussion thus far has set out the theoretical background to the concept of moral 
economy and its application to irrigation. I have identified both diversity in political 
orientation and a tendency to dichotomise between more or less market-oriented 
‘communities’ in a way that simplifies and romanticises. But, as Mc Namara (2019) and Kea 
(2013) argue, moving beyond such simplifications also requires ethnographic engagement 
with emic perspectives. When considering irrigation, this means engaging with specific cases 
of irrigation management. What can be said about how people manage irrigation in such 
cases? How do notions of morality and fairness intersect with the realities of access to 
resources such as land and labour? How do they emerge and take hold (or not)? Do moral 
systems and rules exist ‘autonomously’ and how are rights to and control over resources 
shaped by factors beyond the local?  
 
In what follows I therefore explore these questions through an account of small-scale 
irrigation in Southern Malawi. My observations arise from my participation in a donor-
funded research project whose initial aims were precisely to identify and consider the 
transferability of norms of moral economy for irrigation in sub-Saharan Africa. As time went 
on, and as I discuss below, it became evident that such aims make as little sense in Southern 
Malawi as they did to Thompson when he discussed English food riots. This has been the gist 
of my argument above, but the empirical case provides further support. Research took the 
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form of participant observation over a year combined with informal and group interviews, the 
details of which are provided in [     ]6. 
 
An irrigation scheme in Southern Malawi 
Small-scale irrigation at what is now the Muona Scheme in Nsanje District in the Lower 
Shire Valley has taken place at least since the mid-1950s, though it is likely that such 
practices existed earlier as there is a long history of farmers irrigating their crops from rivers 
and in low-lying wetlands, both in Malawi and throughout the region (Veldwisch et al. 2009). 
During the 1950s, farmers, mainly women, diverted water from the Tangadzi River to irrigate 
their crops. These activities then became formalized as part of a set of wider attempts to 
improve the productivity of agriculture. In an area named after the colonial officer based 
there, Magreaver, farmers’ irrigation practices became more systemetised, and assistance was 
provided in diversifying crops and introducing new varieties, particularly of rice.  With 
Independence in 1964, a government push to increase irrigation across the country led to the 
establishment of 16 smallholder settler schemes between 1969 and 1975, including at Muona 
(Ferguson and Mulwafu 2007, Veldwisch et al. 2009).   The Muona scheme was built by the 
government with assistance from Chinese aid between 1969 and 1972. This greatly expanded 
the area developed at Magreaver, incorporating both the matrilineal Mang’anja people who 
were already settled in or near Magreaver, and others from further afield, including patrilineal 
Sena migrants, originally from Mozambique, some of whom were displaced by the scheme 
creation.  
 
Until 1975, the scheme received technical assistance from China, including the introduction 
of new and better yielding rice varieties. Each block had an allocated extension officer and a 
                                               
6 [Project information withheld for review] 
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‘water guard’. An irrigation officer was also stationed at the scheme, and discipline was 
enforced by the paramilitary wing of the ruling Malawi Congress Party, the Young Pioneers. 
From the mid-1970s, however, the scheme gradually declined, partly because of siltation of 
the canals. There was an attempt at rehabilitation in the mid-1980s (with some temporary 
support provided by the Danish International Development Agency), but by the mid-2000s, 
like many other such schemes7, it was seen as a costly failure. Recently, in line with the 
national and international revival of interest in support to irrigation, it has been ‘rehabilitated’ 
with World Bank and IFAD funding under the IRLAD project, which operated between 2006 
and 2015.  Along with infrastructural improvements, the rehabilitation prioritised the 
strengthening of institutions for managing the scheme, including re-launching the WUA and 
formally handing the control of the scheme over to it as representative of the irrigation 
community. 
 
Muona now covers about 450 hectares organized into twelve blocks supplied from the 
Tangadzi River by a network of canals to support rice (and some maize) farming. In 2015, 
there were just under 2500 plot holders. The river brings silt as well as water, providing a rich 
alluvium that supports agricultural production. Farmers combine the cash cropping of rice 
(and some maize) on the scheme with rain-fed maize, millet, sorghum, beans and pigeon 
peas, grown on the adjacent non-irrigated areas. Muona is gravity-fed, but given the varied 
the topography, some sections are difficult to irrigate while others are hard to drain, suffering 
from waterlogging and salinization and siltation. These problems with aspects of the design 
of the scheme intersect closely with the social and political factors that shape its 
management, as I will discuss below.  
                                               
7 The history of the development of irrigation in Malawi is outlined in Veldwisch et al. 
(2009). 
	 16	
 
Getting the work done: land and labour access 
Irrigation necessarily requires a degree of collective management; there is a need to 
coordinate planting times and to ensure that canals are free of weeds, for example. In the 
literature discussed above, this is either enforced by the rules of moral economy, or its failure 
is seen as an illustration of moral economy not functioning very effectively. But what 
happens in practice is shaped as much by factors such as gender and differences in wealth as 
by simple rules or norms, however discourses of fairness and normative judgements may play 
a role. Understanding this requires a consideration of what shapes such differences and 
analysis of both access to land and access to labour is a part of this.  
 
In Muona, access to land is an important aspect of differentiation and the ways in which land 
is ‘owned’ or tenanted is complex, reflecting both earlier claims and present realities, where 
the very notion of ‘ownership’ is subject to conflicting interpretations, particularly where 
there are multiple claims. This all has implications for how the scheme is managed, 
particularly in terms of the relationship between tenants and landlords. Formally, in Malawi, 
three forms of land tenure are recognised: ‘customary’, ‘private’ and ‘public’ property, and 
there is currently considerable debate about land reforms that seek to lessen the role of chiefs 
in the allocation of customary land, and to create greater formalisation of land access (Peters 
2010, Chinsinga and Wren-Lewis 2013). These debates are played out in the ways that 
people negotiate access to land in Muona where residents distinguish between ‘owned’ and 
‘rented’ land and the history of land acquisition plays a part in contemporary claims.  
‘Owned’ land refers to land that a household or individual is entitled to through either 
customary tenure accessed through inheritance, but also increasingly through purchase. This 
is despite the fact that, formally, land sales are not allowed in the scheme. As one informant 
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told us: ‘If two people agree on selling land they have to go to WUA and settle that. They 
never talk about money; they say that they are exchanging land-farmland for a residential 
plot. Behind all this there is money’8. When it comes to inheritance, marriage between 
historically matrilineal and patrilineal descent groups, alongside public discussions of ideas 
of gender equality, have also somewhat altered peoples’ perceptions of the functioning of 
inheritance, so that there is less distinction in entitlement to inheritance between men and 
women.   
 
‘Rental’ involves a combination of formal leasing alongside much less formal situations in 
which people allow others to farm their plots. In Muona, in the early years of the scheme, the 
predominant payment for access to ‘rented’ land was in-kind, couched in terms of social 
obligation and ‘doing the right thing’.  As one respondent put it: ‘If someone had offered you 
their land to use, it was expected that you would feel compelled to give something to show 
your gratitude. Most people gave a tenth of their harvest to the landowner, and that kept 
relationships positive9’. Such exchanges are now much more monetised. Land in Muona is 
rented out at rates ranging from K4000 (US$8) per 0.1ha K6000 (US$12) in the prime areas 
of the scheme. Despite this, there is a common argument from landlords that their motivation 
to lease out land is out of good ‘moral responsibility’, and that the rent charged is kept 
reasonable so that ‘the poor could also access land and feed their children’. However, 
tenants’ rights and the obligations of landowners are unclear and this has implications for 
management. Ideas about rights and responsibilities articulated here are thus ‘moral’ in the 
sense that they are ethically-framed, but they are not necessarily a ‘moral economy’ as a 
separate or autonomous system. 
                                               
8 Male farmer, February 2015 
9 Male farmer, February 2014 
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In general, the length of tenancies is not more than three seasons. This is because of fears on 
the part of landlords of possible capture by tenants or others, including government. It was 
suggested by several informants that if a tenant were given the same piece of land over 
multiple seasons, he or she might be able to claim ownership in the future, including in the 
event of the death of the landlord. Tenants, on the other hand, tend to dismiss landlords as 
‘lazy’ and argue that their tenancies are insecure because landowners might evict them if they 
were too ‘successful’ in their farming.  They also complain of a problem of ‘rogue’ landlords 
who might try to let the same plot of land to several tenants, especially when these were 
people who came from further away from the scheme. One participant in a tenants’ focus 
group said: ‘There are some very bad apples in the scheme. Some landowners may rent out 
the same plot of land to five people! Yes, we know that most of the landowners are poor 
people, but this is very wrong. It robs people of their annual food supply and income’10  
 
These tensions between landlords and tenants cause fragmentation. Small plots are broken up 
to enable offspring to have land on which to farm, and landowners organise their land in 
0.1ha sections as a standard against which to charge rents. For tenants seeking to use more 
than 0.1ha of land it is likely that they will have multiple landowners with whom to negotiate. 
For example, a farmer using 0.5ha may have five landlords to deal with and pieces of land 
located in different blocks dotted across the scheme. Such an arrangement increases 
transaction costs, but it also makes scheme management very difficult. The tenant has five 
canals to contribute towards clearing; five block committee meetings to attend; has to be 
present on each one of the five plots on the day that they are irrigated to ensure that each plot 
receives water and to complain if that does not happen. They also have to deal with different 
                                               
10 Female participant, focus group, January 2014 
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management issues; waterlogging may be a problem in one plot, an uncooperative neighbour 
on another, and so on.  
 
There are also implications in terms of the contribution of labour to the maintenance of the 
scheme, and of aspirations towards uniformity. Muona operates on a seasonal calendar that 
gives an indication of what the farmer should be doing at a particular time. With the 
formalisation of the scheme, there has been an attempt to create a standardization of farming 
practices. For example, the formal dates for establishing seedling nurseries are between 15th 
January and 15th February, with transplanting expected by the end of February. However, in 
the 2014 season about 40% of all plots had no established nurseries by the beginning of 
March and some people were still transplanting in April. These differences in transplanting 
dates had the effect of creating uneven demand for water across blocks. 
 
This lack of standardisation is accompanied by a common narrative of ‘laziness’ applied to 
those who fail to do things on time: ‘it is like they are being forced to farm’, one woman told 
us11. However, an important part of the picture that is obscured by such narratives is the 
realities of social differentiation within the scheme and the relative poverty of some farmers -
and wealth of others. Much delayed planting reflects the complex relationship between water 
management, food security and casual labour (ganyu), and in particular the fact that 
undertaking ganyu is often a symptom of food insecurity and distress. Bryceson (2008) 
argues that ganyu has increasingly become a relationship between those of unequal asset 
endowments and a sign of rural impoverishment. Historically, such labour exchanges were 
accompanied by a strong sense of moral responsibility; ‘Negotiating around differences of 
economic need and wealth demanded acute sensitivity’ (Bryceson 2008: 90) and reflected a 
                                               
11 Female informant, January 2015 
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balanced reciprocity. However, recent pressures, particularly those associated with decreased 
food security, have resulted in an increase in undertaking ganyu for the poorest and its 
separation from relationships of reciprocity. This in turn affects the timing of the ganyu 
labourers’ farming.  
 
In line with these findings, in Muona many late planters face the challenge of a lack of 
resources, particularly labour and money for inputs. Several pointed out that the onset of the 
rice-farming season coincides with peak food shortage and they are forced to make difficult 
choices between working on the future crop and concentrating on short-term survival. They 
also are unlikely to be able to hire themselves. As one woman said: ‘Just look at me. Do I 
look like the type that can afford ganyu?’12 This particular woman, working on the margins 
of the scheme, lamented its development, saying that people like her have just got poorer 
because she was not allocated a good plot in the first place. Food insecurity thus leads some 
poorer households to sacrifice their own plots in order to meet more immediate food 
requirements, through working as ganyu, thus worsening their longer-term food security. 
Meanwhile, some of the richer households keep food reserves specifically for use for 
payment of ganyu. As noted, these richer households include those who are effectively 
commercial farmers - not resident in the scheme, and who treat their activities within it as just 
one among several other enterprises.  
 
Issues of the ways in which land and labour access influence management thus reflect 
broader considerations of poverty and social differentiation. They are clearly economic and 
may involve an alteration of previously prevailing moral rules. But this is not ‘moral 
economy’ in the dichotomous sense of the embeddedness of one set of (moral) rules that are 
                                               
12 Field interview, November 2014. 
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opposed to a different and external set of rules. Rather, changes in the ways under which 
some people are able to get by are historical processes that in turn reflect changing power, of 
both groups and individuals.  
 
Bureaucratic formalisation, community and autonomy 
In several of the accounts of moral economy discussed above, ‘communities’ are treated as 
not only homogeneous, but as also autonomous and unaffected by political struggle. The 
account of labour and land access shows how differentiation influences notions of fairness. 
But what of the formal institutions and people’s relationship to the world beyond the scheme? 
In Muona, in line with other parts of SSA described above, there has been relatively recent 
bureaucratic formalisation, following a breakdown of earlier rules: ‘In the euphoria of the end 
of Banda’s rule, farmers disregarded cropping calendars… No one seemed to listen to the 
management committees any more. They said they had democracy and democracy meant that 
everyone was free to do as they pleased’13. These narratives of past control and its breakdown 
then play a role in contemporary discourses of blame and responsibility. 
 
With the rehabilitation of the scheme, there has been an attempt to reintroduce formalised and 
bureaucratic management practices via the WUA. Access to water is now managed by an 
elected executive committee, which formally represents the membership, who are part of a 
General Assembly. The executive committee handles operations and maintenance and day-to-
day management of water is through block committees headed by a chairperson who is in 
charge of ensuring that all water users within their respective blocks can access adequate 
water. The block chairpersons report to the executive committee, although the way that this 
works in practice reflects variations in the status and ‘centrality’ of individual block chairs. A 
                                               13	Male farmer, February 2014.	
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board of trustees selected by the General Assembly in theory holds the WUA executive to 
account and a separate Water Jury handles ‘disciplinary issues’.  
 
However, the bureaucratisation of water management and creation of formal structures has 
not been accompanied by much ‘buy in’ to them. For the general membership there is a lack 
of engagement in the management structures, with overall attendance at meetings generally 
very low, often at less than 1% of the membership. Those that do attend tend to be those who 
manage the scheme through their involvement in sub-committees. Such a lack of engagement 
in formal representation structures is of course not peculiar to irrigation schemes, but it does 
bely the notion, presented in many accounts of irrigation management, that the WUA is the 
farmers.  
 
There are also important questions of legitimacy of the bureaucratic structures, raised 
especially by those who feel that they are marginal to these structures and less able to exert 
influence. In focus group discussions, farmers commented on the multiple political 
engagements of the WUA executive, that prevent them from giving their full attention to the 
needs of the scheme. There is also a widespread view that enforcement of regulations is 
weak, partly because of a perspective that questions the motivation of the management 
structures. Even those with a formal role, for example members of the Water Jury, feel that 
they are not able to ‘see fair play’, reflecting contestations over authority. As one put it:  
 
The coming of the WUA led to a relaxation of most of the rules in the scheme and the 
farmers noticed that and are taking advantage…They dislike some of us because they 
think we made tough judgements as we are from another time (Banda’s time), and so 
	 23	
they may appeal against our judgement with the WUA executive. Sometimes they win 
when they go the WUA executive14.  
 
In general, the Water Jury is perceived as not powerful enough to deal with the richer people 
in the scheme: ‘It is not easy to take a rich person to a group of poor farmers. That doesn’t 
work’15. Key informant interviewees told us that, although the Water Jury and WUA 
executive are meant to be on the same level, ‘by virtue of being called an executive, the 
WUA executive thinks it is more senior. Besides, it has a President when the WJ has a 
chairperson’16. 
 
The formal system is meant to ensure fairness in the allocation of water for irrigation, but this 
is highly contested. Water enters the scheme through a main canal and is subsequently 
diverted to the various blocks, depending on the rotation, via a network of secondary canals 
that rely on the opening and closing of gates located within these canals. However, conflicts 
are regular, often when farmers have blocked the movement of water across the scheme. One 
remarked that: 
 
When water is in short supply people get very selfish. Everyone wants to fill their 
field with water. They put themselves first. Some people may even block water from 
leaving their fields, which means that those in the interior cannot access water. This is 
very bad because when those in the interior fail to get water they start getting agitated 
                                               
14  Water Jury member, December 2014 
15 Water Jury former treasurer, November 2014 
16 Extensionist, November 2014. 
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and forcefully demand that water be released. This is how fights flare up; people are 
willing to fight to the end just so they can get water 17  
 
In theory, proportionality in water access is enforced through an irrigation schedule in which 
each one of the scheme’s thirteen blocks are allocated the same duration of 48 hours of 
watering as a standard by the WUA committee. On this basis, all blocks are meant to get the 
same amount of water. In practice, those blocks that had not been levelled when the scheme 
was created (which tend to be those further away from the main canal as well) get far less 
water. For these blocks, canals are too low relative to the plot level so greater effort is needed 
to bring the water to the field. Farmers argue that individuals with positions of authority in 
the scheme, including WUA committee members and block chairpersons, tend to have better 
land allocations with better water availability. One farmer complained that: 
 
The problem is that the block chairmen often cultivate plots in the better sections of 
blocks and never get to understand concerns of those in the drier parts. We should be 
selecting block leaders from the drier sections of the block… Even if you were to 
complain that the (allocated) forty-eight hours did not allow for adequate wetting of 
your field, they wouldn’t agree to add a few more hours. They know they end up 
getting more water as a result18  
 
A key informant working in one of the disadvantaged blocks, argued that it was in the interest 
of the WUA committee not to tolerate any requests for more water from less well served 
blocks:  
                                               
17 Male respondent, February 2014. 
18 Male respondent, January 2014.	
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Since our block is more difficult to irrigate, we have often argued for more time 
allocation but this request has been turned down by several times by the WUA 
committee. As farmers ourselves we know that they would never agree to that, they 
suspect that their crops would suffer if we were given more time19.  
 
In general, there is a narrative that richer farmers get away with unfair allocations and that 
there is nothing that can be done about it. In turn, wealth is related to historical factors such 
as original allocations of land, as well as the fact that some farmers are absentees who have 
‘bought in’ to the scheme. Perceptions of unfair allocation also has gendered dimensions; at a 
women’s focus group discussion, we were told that water theft is prevalent, but female 
farmers often fail to report this because of fears of physical violence. Men also dominate the 
block committees; all ten chairpersons are men and women are less likely to be listened to: 
‘Most women do attend meetings in the scheme, but they cannot compete with the men. 
Overall, there are more women than men, but the men still dominate discussions’20 
 
A female farmer argued that, historically, water guards had been responsive to the plight of 
farmers in poorly levelled blocks. The water guards were salaried officers whose priority was 
fair allocation of water, and their job descriptions included ensuring that all farmers received 
adequate water. However, she suggested that in the system under the WUA and block 
chairpersons, their own interests were fulfilled at the expense of fellow farmers. She told us 
that: ‘In the past we used to tell the water guard that some plots had not been watered, and he 
                                               
19 Farmer in block E, October 2014 20	Women’s	focus	group	discussion,	October	2014	
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would come and check and release more water. Nowadays we may tell the block chair and if 
his block is watered he won’t care any less’21.  
 
In the case discussed by Mvungi (2008) above, the Tanzanian irrigators’ failure to abide by 
rules inspired by outsiders is taken as an indication that they are relatively autonomous and 
‘uncaptured’. I would suggest a rather different interpretation of the apparently similar 
material from southern Malawi, which in turn reflects the way in which the ‘community’ of 
the scheme is both diverse and not neatly bounded. Muona should no more be described as 
‘autonomous’ than similar areas in many other parts of rural sub-Saharan Africa; those living 
within Muona are intimately connected to the social economic and political worlds that 
surround them, especially through their experiences with government and donors and through 
the differentiating effects of such experiences. Importantly, and contrary to common 
representations, they also do not constitute ‘communities’ in any obvious way. The ‘irrigation 
community’ of Muona is not only divided by wealth and gender; it also contains members 
whose association with the scheme is somewhat tangential. 
 
It is thus not possible to identify some ‘indigenous’ way of managing resources that is 
independent of the impacts of interventions and relationships beyond the scheme. Nsanje 
District as a whole has long been a focus of both external intervention, from colonial plans to 
improve agricultural productivity, to more recent government and donor support responding 
to perennial combination of poverty, natural disasters and an influx of refugees from 
Mozambique. The highly populous district (averaging 123 people/km2 , NSO, 2008) has high 
levels of poverty and has, over many years, been subject to both serious droughts and 
catastrophic flooding. In 2015, severe floods were caused by tropical cyclone Chedza 
                                               
21 Woman in poorly levelled plot, Feb 2014 
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resulted in the loss of about 200 lives and displacement of 170,000 people. In 2019, cyclone 
Idai, which devastated neighbouring Zimbabwe and Mozambique, also resulted in the 
displacement of some 11,000 people in Nsanje District.   
 
Partly because of these conditions, there have been numerous interventions in the District 
from a range of external donors and projects. As noted above, Muona itself has been 
supported by a series of international and national development actors.  There is therefore a 
complex intersection of bureaucratic legitimacy influenced by links to outsiders and by 
historically-rooted senses of justice and injustice concerning such links – not a set of 
institutions that are in any way simply embedded in the local. Those who live in Nsanje are 
responding to these influences:  anticipating assistance, feeling insecure over their access to 
land, or suspicious of ‘authorities’ that tells them what to do. Indeed, in Muona, farmers were 
keen to get leases for their land to ‘protect’ themselves from such insecurity of possible 
government acquisition.  
 
In addition to such influences, there is the important issue of belonging and attachment to the 
community of the scheme. In Muona the ‘scheme’ is a geographical entity that overlaps with 
other entities, to which those that farm in the scheme are only variably attached. The scheme 
draws farmers from a radius of several kilometres, and from 45 different surrounding 
settlements.  As noted, each of these farmers combines cultivation in the scheme with either 
dryland farming or other enterprises, or both. Some are thus only ‘part timers’, or landlords 
for which the irrigation scheme is just one of their many investments. Others are relatively 
impoverished and can only afford to participate in a marginally committed way, especially if 
their land in the scheme is a tiny inherited plot. These factors may go some way to explaining 
the lack of engagement in WUA meetings or willingness to undertake collective labour. 
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Therefore, however much both state and donors refer to the ‘community’ that is expected to 
manage the irrigation scheme, such a community may well be less meaningful in people’s 
lives than possible other communities. Rather than being an identifiable moral economy 
located in groups there is, in Muona as elsewhere, a combination of moral judgements 
combining in complex ways with different people’s individual and collective interests and 
experiences.  
 
Concluding discussion 
As Ferguson (2006) has argued, moral discourses and moralizing are prevalent across Africa, 
but these do not constitute a rigid system; rather they provide a ‘moral vocabulary for talking 
and thinking about issues of wealth, prosperity, profit and exploitation’ (Ferguson 2006: 72). 
From the discussion above it is clear that the idea of an embedded moral economy that shapes 
behaviour blinds us to the fact that all economies, whether ‘ancient’ or ‘modern’ are both 
economizing and normative in nature (Arnold 2001). Moral ideas are always entangled with 
economic relations and perceptions of institutional legitimacy. The farmers of Muona thus 
make strategic calculations about how and whether to deploy labour, when to plant, or 
whether to help out with canal maintenance, alongside strong views on what is right, wrong 
or ‘moral’ behaviour. Such views are clearly manifested in the moral discourses of fairness, 
laziness and bureaucratic legitimacy identified above. However, rather than argue that there 
are specific ‘African’ (or Malawian) moral economies that either facilitate economic 
development or, as here, impede it, this material suggests that it is instead the case that the 
moral is always present in economic and social relations and vice-verse.  In this case, the 
existence of moral discourses does not constitute a ‘moral economy’, but the ways in which 
these discourses are articulated reflects differing positionalities, which vary by wealth or 
poverty, closeness to the bureaucracy, gender, and landholding status. This can lead to both 
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cooperation and conflict, but is a far cry from an ‘economy of affection’ existing outside of 
such factors. 
 
Those who have identified ‘moral economies’ of irrigation elsewhere, particularly where 
irrigation has a long and well-established history, might argue that the lack of strongly 
identifiable moral economies at Muona is precisely the result of the peculiarities of the 
empirical case – here, the lack of a long irrigation history. My point is a broader one: that a 
focus on finding rules as static entities may draw attention away from how people are 
differently able to shape and call upon them; there is is often quite some distance between 
nominal rules and how people actually behave (Komakech et.al 2012, Mosse, 2003, 2006).  
Attempts to discern moral economies that exist as part of some precapitalist order, and a 
dichotomy between moral economies and those less ‘culturally embedded’ (Cieslik 2016:14) 
thus conceal how in all resource struggles moral claims are made. The case that I have 
discussed here therefore does not represent the failure of a set of rules that might otherwise 
ensure effective management. This is because such rules are shaped by diverse forces, and 
should be understood through analysis of how different people are differently able to shape, 
make, and break those rules.  
 
The idea of ‘autonomy’ that is invoked by those who present what I have characterised as a 
romantic version of moral economy suggests a binary between the ‘local’ and that which is 
outside it, which obscures interconnections through which ‘the local’ is embedded in wider 
processes. As I have discussed, this is often accompanied by a simplification of the idea of 
community that misrepresents how people may belong to varying communities, which 
partially intersect with location, but also with a wide range of other characteristics. ‘Moral 
economies’ are not simply there to be uncovered and the economic and power relations that 
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shape them are significant. Therefore, rather than focusing on ‘norms’ and rules at a ‘local’ 
level, it is necessary to understand how rules and institutions evolve in ways that reflect 
power across levels. This means considering the ways in which national and international 
politics and history intersect with various dimensions of the local. Political economy 
considerations of ownership, access to and control over resources, labour relations and the 
formation of institutions in specific contexts are central here and have both economic and 
moral dimensions (Bernstein 2010, Fairbairn et.al 2014, Peluso and Lund 2011, Peters 2013, 
Watts 2015).  Such concerns may well be occluded by a focus on moralities as essential and 
vested in communities.  
 
All of this matters, because, as established in the first sections of this article, dichotomous, 
evolutionist and romantic perspectives on moral economy are still articulated in both policy 
and academic circles, including for irrigation. The problems of how ethical choices are made, 
and under what conditions people work together to manage scarce resources continue to be 
important to policy makers. However, explanations that focus less on considerations of power 
and complexity, and more on essentialisms, have a particular attractiveness. Why is this? I 
would suggest that this has much to do with the politics of the concept of moral economy. 
While some anthropologists have called for its rescuing from its more depoliticised framings, 
it is precisely such framings which are both more comprehensible and less threatening to 
policy makers. In irrigation, focusing on farmer management and bureaucratic organisation 
can, charitably, be seen as a part of an honourable tradition of emphasising ‘farmer first’22. 
More problematically, it can also be part of the well-documented tendency to root 
explanation in ‘the other’ (farmers), with less attention to the political context and complex 
                                               
22 ‘Farmer first’ approaches (Chambers 1974, Chambers et al 1989) were originally a radical 
alternative to ‘top down’ development, but some see them as becoming domesticated as they 
have been mainstreamed in development policy.  
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systems of political, economic and moral relationships within which they make their lives. 
The formalisation of mechanisms to control and manage irrigating farmers, along with an 
focus on entrepreneurialism, is part of this tendency. Critique of such narratives may have 
been part of the bedrock of the anthropology of development for thirty years or so23, but there 
is little sign of them changing.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
23 The literature on this is extensive, but key sources include, Gardner and Lewis 1996, Grillo 
and Stirrat 1997, Li 2007, Mosse 2005, Porter et al 1991.	
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